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The Importance of Being Remembered: 
Prices for Cemetery Plots in the US 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The economic literature on end-of-life choices assumes that the utility of future generations is 
internalized by current generations through gifts and bequests. This explanation, however, 
cannot account for the decision to buy cemetery plots. This paper uses an original data set to 
look at the determinants of the grave prices in the US. “After-life” housing services are 
complements to “in-life” housing services. We find no evidence of selection bias associated 
with religious affiliation. 
Keywords: Real estate, House prices, Grave prices 
JEL classification: L85, Z13 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper addresses a largely overlooked issue in economics: the market for cemetery plots. 
The importance of the funeral housing market cannot be underestimated. In the US, funeral 
services are a $16 billion a year industry, with about 25,000 businesses and with an average 
profit margin which increased from 5.8 percent in 2008 to 6.5 percent in 2013 (Barrett, 
2013). The current death rate of 0.8% per annum implies an estimated need for 1.76 million 
burial or entombment spaces per year. According to the Final Arrangements Network, every 
year about 1.5 million people look for a cemetery property in USA.
1
 Nearly 30% of the US 
population already own some kind of cemetery property. Current demographic trends are 
likely further to increase pressure on burial spaces, which are expected to become scarce 
especially in urban areas (McManus, 2015; Tsang, 2015). 
One possible reason for the neglect of the market for funeral services is the notion that 
a rational homo oeconomicus ought not to be concerned with this issue. Yet this view does 
not take into account the overwhelming historical importance attached to burial according to 
the majority of social and religious norms, at least in Western countries. In standard models 
in economics, individuals do not attach utility to what happens after their death unless they 
                                                          
1
 Private communication by Final Arrangements Network to the authors. The Network provides funeral and 
cremation services and lists plots for purchase and for sale across the USA. 
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are linked to their descendants or to future generations through other-regarding preferences. 
Economics, in spite of its reputation as “the dismal science”, tends to ignore the issue of 
death and burial. The infinitively-lived representative agent model is the standard workhorse 
in intertemporal economics and, even when death is allowed, the infinite-horizon paradigm 
can be restored by assuming that altruistic generations are linked by a perfect chain of gifts 
and bequests, possibly modified to allow for strategic interactions between generations as in 
the classic paper by Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985). 
It is however difficult to motivate the purchase of cemetery plots as a direct form of 
altruism towards one’s children: rather, this can be justified by the desire to be remembered. 
A cemetery burial will make it easier to keep the memory of one’s ancestors alive, and 
knowledge of this could generate a positive utility. Individuals could consider that their 
descendants will find comfort from visiting their grave. Visiting cemeteries and funerary 
homes and remembering one’s ancestors transmit cultural and familial attachment across 
generations.
2
 
 Other social science disciplines have also largely ignored burial practices and 
cemetery grounds. Exley (2004) argues that such scant attention may reflect a societal instinct 
for self-preservation, which may be related to the need to exorcise the deep anxieties 
associated with the fear of death (Becker, 1973; see also Solomon et al., 2015). Studies of the 
architectural and geographic aspects of cemeteries as “total landscapes” have also been very 
sparse: Francaviglia (1971) is one of the few examples. 
Economic contributions to the field include Harrington and Krynski (2002) and 
Harrington (2007), who provide evidence on the lack of competition in the funeral services 
market, and Case and Menendez (2011), who examine funeral expenses by South African 
households. Hussein and Rugg (2003), Wickersham and Yehl (2013) and Longoria (2014) 
focus on the management of cemeteries, whilst Harrington and Treber (2013) look at the 
market for cemeteries and funeral establishments. In a recent paper, Faye and Channac 
(2016) analyse the main determinants of burial plot pricing in French cemeteries using a 
hedonic model. 
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing the market for cemetery 
properties in the US, which is unregulated compared to other countries and thus approximates 
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a competitive market. We make use a hitherto unutilised data set based on the asking prices 
listed by Grave Solutions, a company founded in 1996 which manages a large resale 
programme for cemetery properties. We collected the selling price offers for all US states in 
December 2010. In total, we obtained data on 10,674 advertisements. These include 
information on the cemetery name, city, state, property type, and the selling offer price.
3
 We 
could also establish whether the transaction referred to a direct sale, or whether Grave 
Solutions was acting as a broker between a buyer and a seller. The latter transactions have 
been excluded from the analysis, which therefore only includes direct sales between parties. 
 In a relatively unregulated market like the US it is not uncommon to find 
advertisements of grave exchanges due to migration to a different State. This secondary 
market for graves offers a unique opportunity to carry out an empirical investigation of the 
market for funeral services. As a rule, funeral homes are not allowed to offer a discount from 
their general price list.
4
 Hence, the prices at which cemetery plots are put for sale by funeral 
homes may not be consistent with market clearing. However, the prices at which cemetery 
spaces are exchanged through a resale programme would reflect more closely the balance 
between demand and supply of funeral plots. 
 We have also collected data on house prices, in order to be able to compare them with 
grave prices. A data set on real estate selling offer prices has been constructed from Trulia 
Real Estates, which reports house prices by neighbourhood, city, county, and state. The 
information on house prices has been matched with the data on grave prices to investigate 
their comovements and determinants. 
 It could be argued that grave and housing prices are both closely related to the price of 
land (see for instance Harvey and Jowsey, 2004), and therefore it is important to account for 
the latter in order to establish whether house prices still have an influence on grave prices, 
once the price of land is controlled for. In order to address this potential criticism, we made 
use of data on land prices from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Land prices are 
computed as the difference between the home value and the cost of building a new 1,800-
square foot one-story home. In addition to land prices, we also measured the regulatory 
                                                          
3
 The paper considers the asking prices because our implicit assumption is that they approximate prices at which 
cemetery plots are actually bought and sold. In this perspective they can be considered equilibrium price levels. 
4
 Their prices are regulated by the Federal Trade Commission, which can impose penalties for violations of their 
rules (FTC, 2015). 
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environment for the housing market with the help of the Wharton Residential Land Use 
Regulatory Index developed by Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008). This indicator measures 
the stringency of land use control across over 2,000 jurisdictions in the US.
5
 
 We consider a simple demand and supply model where the services from both real 
estate and graves enter individuals’ utility function, and derive testable propositions to 
analyse the relationship between housing when alive and after death. In the empirical analysis 
we control for a number of additional possible determinants of the housing price, such as 
demographic and religious variables, and for the potential endogeneity of house prices. We 
also carry out a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our findings with respect to the 
intensity of religious affiliation. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple choice theoretic 
model for both conventional and funeral housing services. Section 3 describes the data used 
in the analysis. Section 4 presents and discusses our main empirical findings. Section 5 
carries out a sensitivity analysis to establish the robustness of our results. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. The market for housing services 
 
We consider a very simple model as a guide to the empirical analysis. Because of the cross-
sectional nature of our data, we would not be able to study the implications of intertemporal 
choice nor the possible strategic interactions among family members pertaining to the 
demand for funeral services. We therefore consider a lifetime utility function for the 
household, whose arguments are the consumption of after-life, or funeral housing services h1, 
the consumption of in-life, or conventional, housing services h2, and the consumption of a 
residual composite commodity c: 
               (1) 
where    represents a vector associated with individual preferences, including religious 
beliefs and demographic characteristics, which capture heterogeneity across households. The 
                                                          
5
 The level of regulation for the use of land can have a relevant impact on house prices (Zhang et al., 2013). 
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utility function               is increasing in all its arguments and strictly quasi-concave. 
As explained in the introduction, the inclusion of the funeral housing services h2 is motivated 
by the desire to be remembered after the end of one’s life. The lifetime budget constraint 
takes the form: 
               (2) 
where y is lifetime income, p1 and p2 denote the prices of funeral housing services and of 
conventional housing services respectively, and where the price index for the residual 
consumption commodity has been normalized to one. 
 The Marshallian demand functions for the housing services h1 and h2 obtained from 
the maximization of the utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) can be written 
as: 
                   i = 1, 2 (3) 
The corresponding price elasticities are defined as: 
     
                
      
 i, j = 1, 2 (4) 
and the income elasticities as: 
    
                 
     
 i = 1, 2 (5) 
where ln denotes natural logarithm. 
 The relationships of complementarity and substitutability between housing services 
can be expressed in terms of their cross-price elasticity    ,     (Deaton and Muellbauer, 
1980). In particular, in-life and after-life housing services are complements if       and 
substitutes if      . A housing service is a necessity if the income elasticity of its 
Marshallian demand function is less than one:     , and a luxury if     . Finally, a 
housing service can be defined an inferior good if the income elasticity of its Marshallian 
demand function is negative:     . 
 The housing services supply is described by the following function: 
                    i = 1, 2 (6) 
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where    is the price of land and where    is a vector of supply-side variables, which capture 
spatial heterogeneity and which include regulations on land use. The prices of funeral 
services and of housing services,    and   , are jointly determined by the system of equations 
(3) and (6). Hence, the price of housing services must be regarded as endogenous when 
looking at the determinants of the price of funeral services. The components of the vector    
which are not included in   , such as regulations on land use, would be suitable instruments 
for housing prices in the econometric estimations. 
 The model presented above allows us to study the variability across U.S. states of the 
prices of housing and funeral services as related to both the demand and the supply of these 
services. After controlling for endogeneity, a positive relationship between the prices of in-
life and of after-life housing services can be interpreted as corresponding to conventional 
housing and funeral services being complementary commodities in the households’ utility, 
whist a negative relationship would correspond to these services being substitute 
commodities for households. 
 
3. The data 
 
The original data set used in this paper has been constructed on the basis of 10,684 
observations from Grave Solutions.
6
 This is a network that provides information on cemetery 
properties for sale offered by private parties, by cemeteries, and through brokerage services 
in the US. In order to obtain a sufficiently large sample, we collected all the advertisements 
of stocks for sale that were published in December 2010. All the data have been manually 
downloaded from the records reported in the website. The publicly available information 
includes the cemetery name, city, state, property type, selling offer price, number of spaces or 
of crypts, and whether Grave Solutions is acting as a broker in the transaction. The property 
is classified as a mausoleum if it is above ground and as a cemetery plot if it is below ground.  
 The main advantage of using Grave Solutions as our main data source is that this 
network supports a large resale programme for cemetery properties. In the USA, most funeral 
                                                          
6
 See the Data Appendix. 
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homes cannot offer a discount from their general price list (FTC, 2015). As a consequence, 
the prices at which they sell their cemetery plots may involve rationing on the short side of 
the market, and therefore may not be fully consistent with market clearing. Since Grave 
Solutions specializes on the resale of cemetery spaces, however, the prices at which these 
spaces are offered are likely to be closer to the market clearing prices. Use of the offer price 
rather than the price at which graves are actually exchanged should not bias our statistical 
estimates, since there is no reason to believe that the bid-ask spread would be correlated to 
the control variables in the regressions. 
 The variable on grave prices has been obtained by dividing the price of the cemetery 
plot or mausoleum by the number of spaces. It is therefore a unit price per cemetery space. 
The average unit grave price is US$ 2,261.941 and the median price is US$ 1,900.00, with a 
standard deviation of US$ 2,021.23. All the observations for which Grave Solutions is acting 
as a broker, and for which a transaction fee of 15% of the gross sale price is applied, have 
been excluded from the sample. Our analysis therefore only includes those observations 
which pertain to a transaction between a buyer and a seller. 
 In some of the main econometric investigations in this paper, grave prices have been 
averaged by state. Table 1 summarizes key descriptive statistics in 2010 for the main 
variables used in the analysis.
7
 The average personal income in the sample of states is about 
$34,875. The average house price is $304,485, whereas the average grave price is $1,960. 
The highest grave price is observed in Hawaii with $3,807, whilst the lowest is recorded in 
Maine with $700. Hawaii also has the highest house price ($913,148) and land price 
($483,730), as well as the highest land regulation index. The lowest house price is observed 
in Ohio ($170,887) and the lowest land price in Iowa ($7,095); Kansas is the least regulated 
country. 
Table 1 also provides details of the proportion of population aged 65 or over, of the 
mortality rate, of the percentage of religious affiliation, of the cremation rate and of the 
urbanization rate. The urbanization rate is highest in California (95%) and lowest in Maine 
(38.7%). The cremation rate is highest in Nevada (73.0%) and lowest in Mississippi (12.5%). 
 The correlation coefficients between pairs of variables are shown in Table 2. Grave 
price, house price, personal income and land price are expressed in natural logs, which is the 
                                                          
7
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format used in the regression equations. Some of the variables are strongly correlated across 
the states in the sample. In particular, the grave price is correlated both with the house price 
(0.3290) and with the urbanization rate (0.4856). Interestingly, the grave price is negatively 
correlated with the proportion of population over 65 years of age (-0.3364). The land price is 
correlated with the house price (0.8270) and with personal income (0.5179). The urbanization 
rate is also correlated with the house price (0.6032), land price (0.5106) and personal income 
(0.6329). The cremation rate is correlated with both house price (0.5029) and land price 
(0.5148), but not with the grave price (the correlation coefficient is only 0.1699). The 
Wharton land regulation index of Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008) is highly correlated 
with both house price (0.7765) and land price (0.7701), but not with grave price (0.1853), 
which suggests that it could constitute a valid instrument for the endogenous house price in 
the equation for the grave price. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
 
4.1. Grave prices 
Our data set contains information on over 10,000 observations on grave prices. Unfortunately 
it is not possible to obtain information on the individuals or on the households that purchased 
the cemetery plots. We cannot therefore match grave prices with the individual characteristics 
of buyers. It is however possible to match the grave price information with city- and state-
wide variables, and this provides us with the means to explore some potential determinants of 
these prices. 
 Table 3 presents the results of OLS cross-section regressions of the log of individual 
grave prices on a number of city- and state-level variables. The standard errors reported in the 
table are clustered by city.
8
 Column (a) indicates that grave prices are positively related to 
average house prices, whilst column (b) appears to show that they are positively but not 
significantly related to average personal income. When both variables are included in column 
(c), they are both statistically significant. Interestingly, however, personal income now has a 
negative sign. The average land price is not significant when added to the regression in 
                                                          
8
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column (d), whereas the urbanization rate has a significant and positive sign as expected. The 
cremation rate and the proportion of population in the state that declare a religious affiliation 
do not contribute additional explanatory power to the OLS regressions when included in 
column (e). Column (f) is a parsimonious version of column (e): house prices and personal 
income still have a positive and a negative coefficient respectively, and both the urbanization 
rate and the cremation rate are statistically significant and with the expected signs. 
 Columns (g) and (h) display instrumental variables estimates with house price as an 
endogenous variable. The Wooldridge (1995) F score endogeneity test in column (g) strongly 
rejects the null hypothesis that house prices are exogenous. The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) LM 
test for underidentification rejects the null hypothesis that the matrix of reduced form 
coefficients on the excluded instruments has less than full rank, and therefore the model is 
identified. The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) Wald test also rejects the hypothesis that the 
instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor. The Hansen J test for 
overidentification is however statistically significant, indicating that the instruments may not 
be orthogonal to the regression disturbances. The sign of the estimated coefficients remains 
unchanged relative to OLS, but the size of the coefficient on house price is now much larger. 
There is therefore no evidence that the effect of house prices on the price of graves is due to 
endogeneity. On the contrary, OLS understates rather than overstates the effect of house 
prices. Personal income is negative and significant, but so is land price which is puzzling as 
one would expect a positive effect on grave prices. The urbanization rate and the cremation 
rate however now cease to be significant. Religious affiliation remains statistically 
insignificant. 
 Column (h) presents a parsimonious version of (g), with only the significant variables 
included in the regression. The estimated equation passes all the diagnostic tests, including 
now also the Hansen J test on the orthogonality of the set of instruments. 
 These results suggest that the prices for graves tend to move in the same direction as 
prices for conventional housing. A possible interpretation of this result is that both types of 
housing services act as complements in the utility of households. An increased demand for 
housing would also be associated with an increase in the demand for funeral housing, and 
therefore also with a higher price level for grave spaces. 
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 The negative coefficient on personal income can be interpreted as indicating that 
services from funeral homes are considered an inferior good in the household’s utility, since 
their demand declines as income increases. A possible explanation for this negative sign is 
that households may plan to invest up to a fixed amount on cemetery plots. As their income 
increases, the share of money invested in them would therefore decline.
9
 
 
4.2. Grave prices by state 
It is important to establish whether the main results from Table 3 also hold when both the 
dependent variable and the control variables pertain to the same level of aggregation, and are 
therefore coherent in terms of their geographical scope. Table 4 thus shows the results of 
OLS and IV cross-section regressions over 39 US states of the average prices of cemetery 
plots. 
 The main results in Table 4 are consistent with those of Table 3. Columns (a)-(e) 
present OLS regressions and columns (f)-(g) estimates by instrumental variables. Columns 
(e) and (f) are parsimonious specifications of the OLS regression and of the IV regression 
respectively. House prices are positively related and personal income is negatively related to 
grave prices. In contrast to the individual level regressions, however, land price is statistically 
insignificant, whereas the urbanization rate is always positive and significant. The mortality 
rate and the cremation rate also become significant at the state level when they are both 
included in the regression. The cremation rate is here included as a dummy, which takes the 
value of 1 when the cremation rate in the state is greater than the median (33.5%). This 
dummy has a negative sign as expected, since cremation is an alternative to burial. The 
negative sign of the mortality rate represents however a puzzle, since an increased values of 
this rate can be expected to be associated with increased demand for burial places. Religious 
affiliation is not statistically significant when included in the regression in columns (d) and 
(f). Other demographic variables such as the proportion of population aged 65 or over are 
insignificant when included in the regressions. 
 The coefficients in the IV estimates of column (g) have the same sign and are very 
similar in size to the OLS estimates of column (e). At the state level, however, we cannot 
                                                          
9
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reject the null hypothesis that the house price is exogenous. The diagnostic tests confirm that 
the model is identified and does not suffer from weak instruments. The test of overidentifying 
restrictions for the IV estimates is only marginally rejected at 10% significance level (p = 
0.0996). 
The findings at state level confirm that cemetery plots and housing services can be 
regarded as complements, and that funeral services are an inferior good in the utility of 
households. The cremation rate has a negative coefficient as expected. The negative 
coefficient on the mortality rate is a puzzle though, as one would expect this variable to have 
a positive effect on the demand for grave spaces. The positive coefficient on the urbanization 
rate in both the OLS and IV regressions can be explained by the greater competition for land 
use in urban areas, consistent with standard models in land economics (see for instance 
Harvey and Jowsey, 2004, and Feng and Wu, 2015). 
 
5. Sensitivity analysis: the role of religious affiliation 
 
A potentially critical issue with our analysis is that the demand for cemetery plots may reflect 
a form of self-selection. Individuals may choose either to be buried or to be cremated on the 
basis of their religious beliefs. Funeral rituals associated with burial usually follow strict 
normative prescriptions. In our regression analysis, religious affiliation has no explanatory 
power on the price of grave prices either at the individual or at the state level. Religiosity is 
however highly significant in equations for the cremation rate. The estimated regression at 
the state level gives: 
 Cremation rate = 2.596 – 0.026 × Religious affiliation (7) 
 (0.240) (0.003) 
(heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets): grave price, house price, personal 
income, land price and urbanisation rate are not statistically significant. Very similar results 
are obtained at the individual level.
10
 Religiosity can affect the choice of being buried or 
cremated, and could therefore act as a confounding factor in the determination of grave 
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prices. The decision to be either buried or cremated is not random, but depends on religious 
beliefs. There could therefore be a potential selection bias which could affect the estimates of 
the effects of religiosity on grave prices. 
 The present section explores this possibility by carrying out a sensitivity analysis 
where religious affiliation can act as a confounding factor for the price of cemetery plots. We 
are thus able to establish whether our results are robust to the intensity of religious beliefs. 
Our analysis is based on the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), which can be less 
restrictive than the orthogonality assumptions required for regression analysis since it allows 
for more general non-linear effects of the covariates on the dependent variable. The 
unconfoundedness assumption cannot be tested directly, but a general methodology to 
conduct indirect tests is discussed in Imbens (2004). Blattman and Annan (2010) examine the 
impact of abduction and forced combat recruitment on human capital and labour market 
outcomes of Ugandan youth. Becchetti, Fiaschetti and Marini (2014) implement this 
approach to rule out that the more cooperative behaviour of bridge players vis à vis poker 
players can be explained by initial self-selection. 
We examine the robustness of our results on grave prices with respect to religious 
beliefs by implementing a sensitivity analysis based on the procedure illustrated by Nannicini 
(2007) and Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008), which extends Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
and Rosenbaum (1987). The approach by Nannicini and by Ichino et al. simulates a potential 
confounder in order to establish the robustness of the treatment effects with respect to 
deviations from the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). The average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) is usually defined as: 
        |         |         |     (8) 
where Y1 is the outcome if the variable if exposed to treatment: T=1, and Y0 is the outcome if 
the variable is not exposed to treatment: T=0. The counter-factual nature of the ATT effect 
can be seen by considering that     |     cannot be observed. Estimation of ATT usually 
requires the Conditional Independence Assumption, which maintains that the potential 
outcome in the absence of treatment is orthogonal to treatment assignment conditional on a 
set of covariates W: 
     |  (9) 
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In the context of the analysis of this paper, the outcome Y is the price of the grave and T 
represents either burial in a cemetery plot (T=1) or cremation (T=0). The vector W is the set 
of conditioning variables used as regressors in the equation. In our application, ATT would 
thus measure the expected percentage difference in grave prices when a cemetery plot is 
chosen instead of cremation. 
 CIA is an identifying assumption and as such it is untestable. It is however possible to 
assess the robustness of the results with respect to departures from the assumption. The 
sensitivity analysis proposed by Nannicini et al. is based on a confounding variable U such 
that CIA holds conditional on both W and U: 
     |      (10) 
For the analysis of this paper, U is a measure of the intensity of religious beliefs held by 
households. The robustness of CIA can then be established by simulating the potential 
confounder U in the data. Let Y denote the potential outcome for a given unit:        
        . When Y1, Y0 and U are all binary, the distribution of the confounding variable U 
is described by the following parameters: 
           |               |           (11) 
where          . A confounder is potentially “dangerous” when 
        |              |     (12) 
       |           |   (13) 
Ichino et al. (2007) show that it is possible to simulate a “dangerous” confounder if the 
following restrictions hold: 
                |                  |           (14) 
               |             |       (15) 
The restrictions (13) and (14) can thus be expressed in terms of the following assumptions: 
             (16) 
             (17) 
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Assumption (16) requires that the confounder U has a positive effect on the outcome Y, 
conditional on W. Assumption (17) requires that the confounder U has a positive effect on the 
treatment T, conditional on W. The magnitude of these effects is then estimated by logit or 
probit regressions. For the analysis of the present paper, assumption (16) requires that 
religiosity has a positive effect on grave prices, and assumption (17) that religiosity has a 
positive effect on the probability of choosing to be buried in a cemetery plot rather than to be 
cremated. 
 Table 5 presents the results of sensitivity analysis with respect to religious affiliation. 
Continuous variables have been transformed into binary form by setting them equal to 1 if 
they are greater than or equal to the median and as equal to 0 if they are smaller than the 
median. The outcome variable is therefore equal to unity if the price is above the median. The 
baseline estimate average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) on the first row is estimated 
at 0.066 and is not statistically significant. This measures the expected percentage difference 
in grave prices when a cemetery plot is chosen instead of cremation (equation (8)). We then 
proceeded to calibrate the distribution of confounders by considering a range of possible 
values for the probabilities pij in (10): p11 denotes the probability that religiosity is high, 
conditional on the choice of a cemetery plot and on a high grave price; p10 denotes the 
probability that religiosity is high, conditional on the choice of a cemetery plot and on a low 
grave price; p01 denotes the probability that religiosity is low, conditional on the choice of 
cremation and on a high grave price; p00 denotes the probability that religiosity is low, 
conditional on the choice of cremation and on a low grave price. The parameter d measures 
the effect of high religious intensity on the probability of a high grave price, conditional on 
cremation being chosen, whereas s measures the effect of high religious intensity on the 
probability that a cemetery plot is chosen. Both effects are assumed to be positive. 
 The results in Table 5 show that religiosity has the potential for affecting the price of 
graves. In the case of calibration (a), the effect on estimated ATT is a decline from 0.066 to 
0.047, i.e. a reduction by 28.8%. This can be interpreted as the expected decline in the 
difference in grave prices when a cemetery plot is chosen instead of cremation. Under 
calibration (b) the reduction in estimated ATT is 53%, under (c) it is 48.5%, and under (d) the 
estimated ATT declines by 83.3%. The bootstrapped standard errors remain large however, 
and therefore these declines are not statistically significant. Whilst religiosity could play a 
role in affecting the estimated price of cemetery plots when these are chosen instead of 
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cremation, its effect tends to decline with religious affiliation and is never statistical 
significant. The sensitivity analysis therefore does not support the existence of a potential 
selection bias which could affect the estimates of effects of religious intensity on grave 
prices. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The market for cemetery properties in the US is an important one, with one and a half million 
properties per year needed to accommodate the deceased. About one third of Americans 
already own a property whilst alive, and most others rely on their relatives to provide for it 
when the need arises. Yet, the economic aspects of this market have almost never been 
studied before. 
 Our study shows that there is a link between the demand for cemetery plots and the 
demand for conventional housing. The prices of graves and of houses are related at all levels 
of aggregation. Their services can thus be regarded as complements in the households’ utility 
function. A possible justification for including the services from cemetery plots in the utility 
function lies in the desire to be remembered, and in the knowledge that their descendants will 
find it easier to keep their loved ones in their memory by visiting their grave. 
Grave prices are also found to decrease as the level of income increases. A possible 
explanation is that services from funeral homes can be considered as an inferior good in the 
household’s utility, since their demand declines as income increases. The intuition behind this 
is that the share of income invested in funeral services declines for higher income levels. 
 A large number of issues remain to be explored.  It would be useful to have data on 
grave prices over several time periods, so that it would be possible to introduce a time 
dimension to the analysis. It would also be useful to be able to match data on grave prices to 
panel data on households, so that it would become possible to analyse the purchase of burial 
plots as part of an intertemporal planning decision which includes other investment in real 
estate as well as financial investment. 
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 The questions posed above cannot be answered by the data set used in this paper, but 
it is our belief that these are important issues which deserve to be addressed by economists. 
The urgency of the issue is made apparent by the current inadequate provision of burial 
spaces in many parts of the world (McManus, 2015), which is bound to lead to increasing 
attention to the economic and financial aspects of family planning for funeral services. 
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Data Appendix. 
 
Variables and data sources. 
 
Grave price: Unit price of cemetery plot (below ground) or of mausoleum (above ground), 
obtained by dividing the price of the plot or of the mausoleum by the number of spaces. 
Source: Grave Solutions. 
(http://www.gravesolutions.com/Default.asp) 
 
House price: Price of homes for sale. 
Source: Trulia Real Estate. 
(http://www.trulia.com/home_prices/) 
 
Land price (States): Home value minus the cost to build a new 1800-square foot 1-story 
home. 
Source: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
(https://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values/land-prices-by-state.asp) 
 
 
Land price (Metro Areas): Home value minus the cost to build a new 1800-square foot 1-
story home for each of the 46 large metropolitan areas in the United States. 
Source: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
(https://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values/metro-area-land-prices.asp) 
 
Personal income: Total disposable income in current US$ divided by mid-year population. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
(http://www.bea.gov/) 
 
Population > 65: Total population aged 65 years and over divided by total population. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, United States Census Bureau. 
(http://www.census.gov/popest/) 
 
Urbanization rate: Urban Population as a Percentage of the Total Population by U.S. State. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
(https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/urban-rural-2010.html) 
 
Land regulation index: Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index 
Source: Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008). 
(http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~gyourko/landusesurvey.html) 
 
Religious affiliation: Percentages of each state’s population that affiliates with any religion.  
Source: The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Religious Landscape Survey. 
(http://religions.pewforum.org/maps#) 
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Cremation rate: Percentage of deceased persons who are cremated. 
Source: Cremation Association of North America. 
(http://www.cremationassociation.org/) 
 
Population density: Number of people per square mile. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, United States Census Bureau. 
(http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-dens-text.php) 
 
List of states included in the analysis (39). 
 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia. 
 
List of cities (108). 
 
Adelphi, MD; Akron, OH; Alexandria, VA; Allentown, PA; Arlington, TX; Atlanta, GA; 
Augusta, GA; Aurora, CO; Austin, TX; Baltimore, MD; Battle Creek, MI; Bellevue, WA; 
Bethlehem, PA; Birmingham, AL; Bradenton, FL; Canton, OH; Charleston, SC; Charleston, 
WV; Charlotte, NC; Chattanooga, TN; Chicago, IL; Cincinnati, OH; Clearwater, FL; 
Cleveland, OH; Colorado Springs, CO; Columbia, SC; Columbus, OH; Dallas, TX; Dayton, 
OH; Denver, CO; Des Moines, IA; Detroit, MI; Durham, NC; Evansville, IN; Fort Myers, 
FL; Fort Worth, TX; Fresno, CA; Gastonia, NC; Glendale, AZ; Glendale, CA; Grand Rapids, 
MI; Greeley, CO; Greensboro, NC; Greenville, SC; High Point, NC; Hoover, AL; Houston, 
TX; Indianapolis, IN; Jackson, MI; Jacksonville, FL; Kalamazoo, MI; Knoxville, TN; 
Lansing, MI; Las Vegas, NV; Lexington, KY; Little Rock, AR; Livonia, MI; Los Angeles, 
CA; Louisville, KY; Medford, OR; Memphis, TN; Mesa, AZ; Metairie, LA; Miami, FL; 
Minneapolis, MN; Mobile, AL; Montgomery, AL; Morgantown, WV; Murfreesboro, TN; 
Nashville, TN; New Orleans, LA; Norfolk, VA; North Charleston, SC; Ocala, FL; Oklahoma 
City, OK; Omaha, NE; Orlando, FL; Pensacola, FL; Peoria, IL; Philadelphia, PA; Phoenix, 
AZ; Pittsburgh, PA; Pompano Beach, FL; Portland, OR; Raleigh, NC; Richmond, VA; 
Rochester, MI; Rockford, IL; Sacramento, CA; Saginaw, MI; Salem, VA; San Antonio, TX; 
San Diego, CA; Sarasota, FL; Savannah, GA; Seattle, WA; Spokane, WA; St. Petersburg, 
FL; Summerville, SC; Tacoma, WA; Tampa, FL; Toledo, OH; Tucson, AZ; Tulsa, OK; 
Virginia Beach, VA; Washington, DC; West Des Moines, IA; Wilmington, DE. 
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Figure 1. Grave prices by state. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Grave price 1,960 1,948 716 700 3,807 
House price 304,485 260,377 158,893 170,887 913,148 
Personal income 34,875 34,385 4,441 28,387 47,797 
Land price 61,614 27,113 90,995 7,095 483,730 
Urbanization rate 0.747 0.746 0.137 0.387 0.950 
Population density 183.064 104.9 193.933 9.7 839.4 
Population > 65 0.132 0.133 0.015 0.101 0.174 
Mortality rate 0.270 0.163 0.284 0.018 1.434 
Cremation rate 0.384 0.335 0.164 0.125 0.730 
Religious affiliation 83.730 84 4.682 73 92 
Land regulation index -0.156 -0.347 0.769 -1.118 2.304 
 
Note: Religious affiliation is not available for Hawaii and Mississippi. 
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Table 2. Correlation coefficients. 
 
 
Variable 
ln(grave 
price) 
ln(house 
price) 
ln(personal 
income) 
ln(land 
price) 
Urbanization 
rate 
Population 
density 
Population 
> 65 
Mortality 
rate 
Cremation 
rate 
Religious 
affiliation 
Land 
regulation 
index 
ln(grave 
price) 
1.0000           
ln(house 
price) 
0.3290 1.0000          
ln(personal 
income) 
0.0241 0.6425 1.0000         
ln(land price) 0.2193 0.8270 0.5179 1.0000        
Urbanization 
rate 
0.4856 0.6032 0.6329 0.5106 1.0000       
Population 
density 
-0.0695 0.5346 0.6493 0.4702 0.4823 1.0000      
Population > 
65 
-0.3364 -0.0932 -0.0670 -0.0201 -0.2974 0.1057 1.0000     
Mortality rate -0.5491 -0.1367 -0.0621 0.0374 -0.4036 -0.1873 0.3824 1.0000    
Cremation 
rate 
0.1699 0.5029 0.2961 0.5148 0.4965 -0.0399 -0.0330 -0.0115 1.0000   
Religious 
affiliation 
0.0578 -0.4710 -0.2983 -0.4959 -0.3077 -0.0987 0.0594 -0.0091 -0.7977 1.0000  
Land 
regulation 
index 
0.1853 0.7765 0.5907 0.7701 0.5553 0.5277 0.0575 -0.0316 0.6299 -0.5577 1.0000 
 
Note: Religious affiliation is not available for Hawaii and Mississippi. 
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Table 3. Grave prices: OLS regressions on individual data. 
Dependent variable: 
Grave price 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Ln(house price) 
0.393*** 
(0.059) 
- 
 
0.569*** 
(0.076) 
0.595*** 
(0.082) 
0.588*** 
(0.076) 
0.502*** 
(0.050) 
1.466*** 
(0.178) 
1.752*** 
(0.221) 
Ln(Personal income) - 
0.250 
(0.154) 
-0.771*** 
(0.185) 
-0.905*** 
(0.121) 
-1.095*** 
(0.211) 
-1.254*** 
(0.211) 
-1.456*** 
(0.289) 
-1.418*** 
(0.319) 
Ln(land price) - - - 
-0.053 
(0.033) 
-0.031 
(0.026) 
- 
-0.169*** 
(0.041) 
-0.239*** 
(0.038) 
Urbanization rate - - - 
0.746*** 
(0.148) 
1.046*** 
(0.274) 
1.201*** 
(0.343) 
0.362 
(0.392) 
- 
Cremation rate - - - - 
-0.213 
(0.210) 
-0.414* 
(0.233) 
-0.257 
(0.254) 
- 
Religious affiliation - - - - 
0.006 
(0.004) 
- 
0.003 
(0.006) 
- 
Constant 2.577*** 
(0.764) 
4.901*** 
(1.623) 
8.447*** 
(1.507) 
9.667*** 
(1.417) 
10.861*** 
(2.072) 
13.724*** 
(1.882) 
5.894* 
(3.430) 
3.043 
(2.399) 
R
2
 0.037 0.002 0.048 0.402 0.415 0.419 - - 
F 43.722 2.632 28.512 44.048 46.792 71.760 428.42
+ 
66.82
+ 
Prob > F
 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Root MSE 0.613 0.624 0.610 0.178 0.175 0.177 0.222 0.257 
Endogeneity - - - - - - 56.865*** 39.763*** 
Underidentification - - - - - - 48.999*** 25.496*** 
Weak identification - - - - - - 61.936*** 24.317*** 
Overidentification - - - - - - 4.719** 0.017 
No. observations 10,424 10,424 10,424 10,424 10,391 10.424 10,391 10,424 
Columns (a)-(f): OLS. Columns (g)-(h): IV; additional instruments: proportion of population aged 15-44, land regulation index. 
+
 Wald Chi-squared. 
Endogeneity: Wooldridge (1995) F score test. Underidentification: Kleibergen-Paap (2006) LM statistic. Weak identification: Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk Wald F statistic. 
Overidentification: Hansen J statistic.  
Standard errors clustered by city in brackets. Religious affiliation is not available for Hawaii and Mississippi in columns (e) and (g). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4. Grave prices by state: OLS regressions. 
Dependent variable: Grave price (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
Ln(house price) 
0.302* 
(0.154) 
- 
 
0.490*** 
(0.164) 
0.143 
(0.218) 
0.355** 
(0.158) 
2.304* 
(1.372) 
0.484* 
(0.262) 
Ln(Personal income) - 
0.074 
(0.511) 
-0.975 
(0.675) 
-1.309** 
(0.614) 
-1.610** 
(0.635) 
-3.461** 
(1.601) 
-1.793*** 
(0.634) 
Ln(land price) - - - 
0.028 
(0.059) 
- 
-0.381 
(0.269) 
- 
Urbanization rate - - - 
1.325*** 
(0.446) 
1.559*** 
(0.454) 
1.365* 
(0.820) 
1.459*** 
(0.492) 
Mortality rate - - - 
-0.528*** 
(0.161) 
-0.387** 
(0.157) 
0.052 
(0.421) 
-0.385*** 
(0.140) 
Cremation rate - - - 
-0.156* 
(0.089) 
-0.184** 
(0.085) 
-0.141 
(0.199) 
-0.203** 
(0.089) 
Religious affiliation - - - 
0.005 
(0.012) 
- 
0.020 
(0.019) 
- 
Constant 3.727* 
(1.909) 
6.743 
(5.323) 
11.561* 
(5.911) 
17.917*** 
(5.430) 
18.930*** 
(5.681) 
16.095* 
(9.750) 
19.303*** 
(5.401) 
R
2
 0.108 0.001 0.168 0.5671 0.558 - - 
F 3.859 0.021 4.714 10.697 16.150 30.67
+ 
66.62
+ 
Prob > F
 0.057 0.886 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Root MSE 0.361 0.382 0.354 0.267 0.269 0.447 0.250 
Endogeneity - - - - - 2.889 0.320 
Underidentification - - - - - 2.559 7.027*** 
Weak identification - - - - - 1.009 10.436*** 
Overidentification - - - - - 0.244 2.712* 
No. observations 39 39 39 37 39 37 39 
Columns (a)-(e): OLS. Column (f)-(g): IV; additional instruments: proportion of population aged 15-44, land regulation index. 
+
 Wald Chi-squared. 
Endogeneity: Wooldridge (1995) F score test. Underidentification: Kleibergen-Paap (2006) LM statistic. Weak identification: Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk Wald F statistic. 
Overidentification: Hansen J statistic.  
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. Religious affiliation is not available for Hawaii and Mississippi in columns (d) and (f). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis with respect to religious affiliation. 
 
 
 Fraction U=1 by outcome d s ATT Bias % SE 
                
No 
confounder 
 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.066 - 
 
0.246 
Calibrated 
confounder: 
 
         
(a) 
 
0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.14 0.047 28.8 0.245 
(b) 
 
0.8 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.08 0.031 53.0 0.234 
(c) 
 
0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.20 0.034 48.5 0.258 
(d) 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.19 0.011 83.3 0.243 
 
Note 
U=1 if religious affiliation is greater than or equal to the median. 
Bias % = 100·(ATT baseline – ATT)/ATT baseline 
SE: bootstrapped standard errors obtained with 100 replications 
            
            
 
